Ohio Criminal Appeals Lawyer Blog

The Second District Court of Appeals has stated "that false promises made by police to a criminal suspect that he can obtain lenient treatment in exchange for waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege so undermines the suspect's capacity for self-determination that his election to waive the right to incriminate himself in criminal conduct is fatally impaired." State v. Jackson, 2002-Ohio-4680.

Today the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed a trial judge's suppression of a confession because police made the suspect falsely believe he could possibly get ILC instead of prison. In fact the suspect would not be eligible for ILC since he committed felonies of the third degree and one is not eligible for ILC if they have committed felonies of the third degree. R.C. 2951.041(B).

Read the decision here.

If you are accused of a crime or have been convicted already, contact me if you can afford to hire a private attorney. Otherwise, contact your county or state public defender to see if they can help.

In Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, at 484-485, the Supreme Court of the United States said that when a suspect properly asserts his right to counsel before or during custodial interrogation pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, "a valid waiver of [his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation] cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his [Miranda] rights." The cops' only hope would be that the defendant changes his mind and initiates further communication with them. Id. at 484-485.

But today the Supreme Court of the United States put a cap on that protection of the defendant because acquiring "voluntary confessions" is an "unmitigated good" that is "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." In Maryland v. Shatzer (2010), 559 U.S. ___, the SCOTUS said the prohibition on further police attempts to interrogate a suspect like Edwards lasts for just fourteen days. The Justices figure that once the suspect is released from the "Miranda custody" and returns to his "normal life" for fourteen days, the "protective umbrella" of Edwards has served its purpose and the suspect is again fair game.

This is true even for those who are imprisoned based on a previous conviction. The SCOTUS reasoned that a prisoner is not constantly subject to Miranda-type custody when they are living their "normal life" in the general prison population. An inmate is only subject to "Miranda custody" or "interrogative custody" when they are "removed from the general prison population and taken to a separate location for questioning." Once they are released into the general population again, they are living their "normal lives" and the State can try to interrogate the "prisoner suspect" every fourteen days until the prisoner quits asserting his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.

has peeled away an important protection enjoyed by those accused of crimes for years.    Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, protected defendants by holding that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police interrogation is invalid" (page 636).  Basically, defendants were off limits - without the protection of their counsel -  after arraignment and the government's chance to get the isolated defendant to say things that would be used against them would end.

Not anymore.  In Montejo v. Louisiana, by a five to four vote, the Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson.  The majority complained that the rule of Michigan v. Jackson interfered with the State's efforts to "obtain voluntary confessions" which efforts the majority called an "unmitigated good."  The majority figures that police can be trusted to properly advise defendants of their Miranda rights and if the defendant waives those rights, including the right to counsel, then the cops are good to go.  Basically, the Montejo case takes the counsel out of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.  The majority noted that "any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests."  But the defendant will face that question without the assistance of counsel now and "if he so requests" is not so cut and dry as I wrote here.

Ohio's Second District Court of Appeals reversed the aggravated murder and aggravated robbery convictions of Aaron Whitfield when it found that his statement to police should have been suppressed because he was in custody for Miranda purposes but not given his Miranda Rights. At the suppression hearing, only Whitfield and the detective that conducted the interview testified. But since the detective met Whitfield in the interview room at the police department, only Whitfield testified about how he got there.

Whitfield testified that four armed officers met him at his home and told him they needed to talk to him about the 2004 slaying of Nasru Fashions owner Mamadou Njie.  The officers handcuffed Whitfield behind his back and took him in the back of a cruiser to the interview room where he met the interviewing detective.  The handcuffs were removed at the interview room and he was not told he was under arrest.  When Whitfield asked the detective if he was being charged, the detective said "no."

The Second District Court of Appeals found that Whitfield was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda and should have been given his Miranda Rights.  The detective testified about the interview and a videotape of a portion of the interview had been played for the jury.  The Second District reversed Whitfield's convictions based on the Miranda violation and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Whitfield, 2009-Ohio-293 (The Miranda issue is at paragraphs 53-118)

On remand, the defendant reached a deal where he pleaded to lesser charges and was sentenced to 16 years (which is a whole lot better than the 23L he was sentenced to before I won his appeal).  Read a news story by clicking here.

Watch Professor James Duane tell you why you should not.

The Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio (Court of Appeals for Clark County (county court

located in Springfield, Ohio)), reversed an aggravated murder conviction because police failed to "scrupulously honor" the defendant's assertion that he did not want to talk to them.  The United States Supreme Court has stated that once a suspect cuts off questioning by police, that request must be "scrupulously honored" by the police.  Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96.  It wasn't here because after the defendant cut off questioning, one of the officers told him that a co-defendant was trying to lay the blame on him and that this was his chance to help himself out.  Based on those statements by the officer, the defendant changed his mind about talking and incriminated himself in the shooting.  The Second District Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and remanded the case stating that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the incriminating statements.  Click here for the full opinion.