Ohio Criminal Appeals Lawyer Blog

has peeled away an important protection enjoyed by those accused of crimes for years.    Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, protected defendants by holding that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police interrogation is invalid" (page 636).  Basically, defendants were off limits - without the protection of their counsel -  after arraignment and the government's chance to get the isolated defendant to say things that would be used against them would end.

Not anymore.  In Montejo v. Louisiana, by a five to four vote, the Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson.  The majority complained that the rule of Michigan v. Jackson interfered with the State's efforts to "obtain voluntary confessions" which efforts the majority called an "unmitigated good."  The majority figures that police can be trusted to properly advise defendants of their Miranda rights and if the defendant waives those rights, including the right to counsel, then the cops are good to go.  Basically, the Montejo case takes the counsel out of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.  The majority noted that "any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests."  But the defendant will face that question without the assistance of counsel now and "if he so requests" is not so cut and dry as I wrote here.

Ohio's Second District Court of Appeals reversed the aggravated murder and aggravated robbery convictions of Aaron Whitfield when it found that his statement to police should have been suppressed because he was in custody for Miranda purposes but not given his Miranda Rights. At the suppression hearing, only Whitfield and the detective that conducted the interview testified. But since the detective met Whitfield in the interview room at the police department, only Whitfield testified about how he got there.

Whitfield testified that four armed officers met him at his home and told him they needed to talk to him about the 2004 slaying of Nasru Fashions owner Mamadou Njie.  The officers handcuffed Whitfield behind his back and took him in the back of a cruiser to the interview room where he met the interviewing detective.  The handcuffs were removed at the interview room and he was not told he was under arrest.  When Whitfield asked the detective if he was being charged, the detective said "no."

The Second District Court of Appeals found that Whitfield was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda and should have been given his Miranda Rights.  The detective testified about the interview and a videotape of a portion of the interview had been played for the jury.  The Second District reversed Whitfield's convictions based on the Miranda violation and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Whitfield, 2009-Ohio-293 (The Miranda issue is at paragraphs 53-118)

On remand, the defendant reached a deal where he pleaded to lesser charges and was sentenced to 16 years (which is a whole lot better than the 23L he was sentenced to before I won his appeal).  Read a news story by clicking here.

The Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio (Court of Appeals for Clark County (county court located in Springfield, Ohio)), reversed an aggravated murder conviction because police failed to "scrupulously honor" the defendant's assertion that he did not want to talk to them.  The United States Supreme Court has stated that once a suspect cuts off questioning by police, that request must be "scrupulously honored" by the police.  Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96.  It wasn't here because after the defendant cut off questioning, one of the officers told him that a co-defendant was trying to lay the blame on him and that this was his chance to help himself out.  Based on those statements by the officer, the defendant changed his mind about talking and incriminated himself in the shooting.  The Second District Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and remanded the case stating that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the incriminating statements.  Click here for the full opinion.